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"Estimating the Determinants of Employee Performance"
ABSTRACT
Employers often wish to know whether the factors used in selecting
employees do in fact allow them to choose the most qualified applicants.
Because the performance of those not chosen is not observed, sample—
selection bias is a likely problem in any attempt to "validate" employee-
selection criteria. With minor modifications, the recently—developed
techniques for dealing with sample—selection problems can be used in
this context.
Using data on applicants for first—line supervisory positions and
ratings of on—the—job performance of those hired, ordinary least squares
estimates of the determinants of performance are compared with maximum—
liklihood estimates which correct for selection bias. The correction
for selection bias produces some appreciable improvements in some varia-
bles' coefficients, though the corrected estimates remain "insignificant"
at conventional levels. Differences in the firm's stated and actual




College Park, MD 20742
(301) 454—4182The relationship between job performance and individual attributes
knownbythe employer at time of hiring is an important topic among
economists. Selecting the best workforce from a pool of applicants is
an essential function for a firm which hopes to survive competitive pres-
sures. Evidence on how successfully firms perform this function is impor-
tant for verifying the cost—minimizing behavior that most economic analyses
assume) On a more day—to—day level, Federal guidelines on non—discrimi-
natory hiring require that firms demonstrate that hiring criteria which
disadvantage minorities or women are related to subsequent job performance
(U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1978).
The "individual characteristic" most often studied by economists
(and often studied by others) is education. Attempts to use within—firm
data to test whether more—educated individuals are more productive have
produced very mixed results.
Berg (1970, Chapters 5—8) found more—educated workers no more pro-
ductive in a variety of blue collar and (generally lower—level) white collar
occupations. Swartz (1978, pp. 28—30) found education unrelated to secre-
tarial performance at a large conglomerate firm. Brenner (1968, pp. 29—30)
found high school record (grades, teachers' ratings, absenteeism) signifi-
cantlyrelated to job performance among Lockheed—California workers.
Supervisory andtechnicalworkers have been studiedmore extensively,
butagain withoutreal consensus. Wagner (1960,p. 185) found years of
schoolingto be the best single predictor (among 31 variables) of the per—
formance ratings of young executives. Mahoney et al. (1960, p. 156) found
years of schooling "significantly't related (apparently at the 10 percent
level)to supervisors'ratings in a sample of managers. However, Medoff—2—
(1977,P. 23) and Medoff and Abraham (1978, P. 18) found education unrelated
to performance but positively related to salary among managers at the same
grade levels in three large corporations. Korinan's (1968, p. 308) survey
of studies using "personal history" data (including years of schooling) to
predict managerial success concluded that "personal history data seem to
have some predictive value for first—line supervisors" but were less useful
for higher—level managers. Cainbell etal. (1970, Chapter 8) reached more
optimistic conclusions, but education was not among the personal history
variables in several of the studies they reviewed.
Weisbrod and Karpoff (1968) found that, among AT&T college graduates,
school quality and class rank were related to salary, which they used as a
proxy for performance. Wise (1975) found both years of schooling and aca-
demic performance predictive of salary gains among Ford Motor Company engi-
neers, and argued that these gains reflected job performance. Kaufman (1978)
found that graduate courses taken by engineers after being hired were posi-
tively related to performance in research and development, but not in applied
development or manufacturing.
An interesting body of evidence is evolving from employers' need to
"validate" their hiring criteria (i.e., to prove that these criteria reflect
differencesin job performance) in order to satisfy federal standards for
nondiscriminatory hiring; thus far, their efforts have not been very con—
vincing (White and Francis, 1976).
While within—firm studies of worker performance canpotentiallypro—
videvaluable evidence on thequestion of whether individuals withmore
education (or more of some other characteristic) are more productive, they
suffer from a potentially serious statistical flaw. Whether an employer—3—
should prefer more—educated applicants depends on whether the (potential)
performance of such applicants is superior to that of less—educated appli-
cants. Because potential performance of applicants not hired is not ob-
served, the performance of those hired by the firm must be analyzed. Un-
fortunately, comparing performance of more— andless—educatedworkers is
likely to give a biased reading of the difference in performance between
more— and less—educated applicants. If firms prefer more—educated appli-
cants, less—educated applicants who are hired must have some "compensating
virtues" (Jencks etal., 1977, p. 183) known to the hirer but often not to
the researcher. Thus, comparing performance of more— and less—educated
workers understates the edge of the typical (i.e., randomly selected) more—
educated worker over the typical less—educated worker. Moreover, the bias
is more severe when the employer overestimates the importance of education
(Brown, 1978).
This problem is not limited to research on schooling and job perfor-
mance; it is present whenever one attempts to infer the determinants of per-
formance when candidates have been selected using some information not avail-
able to the researcher and his computer (e.g., letters of reference). The
issue has long been recognized in the psychometric literature on testing,
but only highly restrictive models—in which selection is based solely on
a weighted sum of known "test" scores—haw been used successfully. The
typical2 real—world situation in which hiring is based on both recordedap-
plicant characteristics and unrecorded, informal judgment is thought to
present "an insuperable barrier to any analytic treatment" (Thorndike, 1949,
p. l76).—4—
The purposeofthispaperis to apply recent econometric research on
"sample selection" problems to this employee—selection problem. In Section
I, a model of selection and subsequent performance, and an estimation strat-
egy, are presented. In Section II, the data——personnel files of applicants
for supervisory positions at a nondurable manufacturing firm——are described.
Empirical results are presented in Section III, and conclusions offered in
Section IV.—5--
I. Statistical Model
Let N be the number of applicants, indexed by i,nof whom are
selectedby the firm. Among applicants, performance Y. depends on a
set of applicant characteristics which are available to the researcher, X.
and a random variable u. which captures all other determinants of per-
formance:
(1)Y. =X.+ u. i =1,..., N
Thedisturbance u.is assumed to be normallydistributed, with mean zero
andconstant variance for all i ; in particular,u is assumed to
be uncorrelated with X among applicants.Variables such as schooling,
age, and previous experience would be elements of X. ; that portion of
worker motivation that is uncorrelated with schooling, etc., is part of
•If Y. and X. are available for all applicants (or a random sample
of applicants), one could estimate by ordinary least squares.
As noted in the introduction, data on Y. are typically unavail-
able for the N—n applicants who are not hired, because Y is a measure
of on—the—job performance. Unfortunately, these "missing" observations are
not likely to be randomly selected, so that estimating equation (1) with
the available n observations who were hired will be likely to produce
biased estimates of B
Presumably, firms hire those applicants who, based on available in-
formation, are thought to be most productive. The "available information"
includes both data available to the researcher, z, andsome data which—6—
the researcher cannot include in the estimation because it is not available
(the selector's subjective impression of the applicant) or cannot be coded
with confidence (letters of reference). Let e. represent all the factors
which affect applicant i's hiring decision that are uncorrelated with Z.
The firm can be thought of as forming an estimate of the applicant's per-
formance if hired, P. ,basedon Z. and e. 1 1 1
(2) P. =Z.c+ e. i =1,..., N 1 1 1
and hires those with the highest P.'s (those with P. greater than a
cutoff score c ).Assumethat e. is normally distributed with mean zero
and constant variance for all i .Becausethe P.'s are not observed, we 1
can timeasurelt them with arbitrary origin and scale; the normalizations
c =0,varianceof a =1are the most convenient. Therefore, if D. =1
1
whenever individual i is hired, and zero otherwise, we have
D. =1iff Z.a + e. > 0
1 1 1
(3)
D. =0iff Z.a + e < 0
1 1 i
Equation (1) is often estimated by ordinary least squares from the
subsample of individuals who were hired by the firm. To analyze the bias
due to such sample selection, Heckman (1976, p. 477) rewrote equation (1)
as
(1') Y =X.+ E(uIZ.D) + v.
where is the deviation of u from its conditional expectation. For
the subsample of applicants who were hired, D. =1.Fromthe assumption
the u and e. have a bivariate normal distribution, it follows that i 1—7—
E(u.IZ.,Di=l) =E(u.Ie. > —Zc)=poX., wherepisthe correlation of u
and e (among applicants, A. =f(Z.c)/F(Z1a)
,andf() and F(.) are
the standard normal density— and distribution— functions.
Viewing A. as an omitted variable whose "true" coefficient is p
ordinaryleast squares is seen to produce biased estimates of unless
(i) A1 and X. are uncorrelated or (ii) p= 0.SinceZ and X
will typically have elements in common, condition (i) is unlikely to hold.
The plausibility of condition (ii) depends on the selection process. If
e reflects factors that are not related to performance (or if selection
is conducted mechanically on the basis ofZ ,sothat the variance of e
is zero), e and u would be uncorrelated. More likely is the case where
e reflects factors that are related to performance (e.g., the interviewer's
estimate of the candidate's motivation), so that u and e are positively
correlated. It seems likely that the more complete is the set of character-
istics in X and Z ,thesmaller this correlation would be.
Griliches, Hall, and Hausman (1977, pp. 11—21) have presented a
maximum—likelihood estimation procedure which incorporates Heckman's in-
sight that the n observations on hired applicants must be "corrected" for
the fact that they were not randomly selected. The data for the N appli-
cants are arranged so that the n selected applicants are indexed by
i =1,...,nand the (N—n) rejected applicants by i =n+ 1, ...,N
The key to expressing the likelihood function is the string of equalities
e1—(p/a-)u1—Z1cz—(p/o)u.1




Therefore, the likelihood function for an accepted applicant is
(5) LF.(D.=l) f(u./a) Pr(Z.cz+e..>Ou.)
=(2Ta2)h/2)exp
E_cl/2) (1.1)2]F[2Y,i1
The likelihood function for a rejected applicant is
(6) LF.(D.0)Pr(Z.c+e.<O) =F(-Z.cz)
The logarithm of the likelihood function for the whole sample is





2l/2' + in F(—Z.a)
i=l L(1—p)'1i=n+l -1.
Thusfar,ithas beenimplicitly assumed that performance ratings
are availablefor all individuals chosen by the firm. In the employee—se-
lection context, this assumption can be violated in two ways: some "selected"
applicantswilldecide to reject the firm' soffer of employment, andratings
may be unavailable for some of those hired. The best way to handle these
exceptions depends on what is knownaboutwhy they became exceptions (i.e.,
are they thought to be nonrandom.ly "selected" from among individuals selected
by the firm?) and on their relative frequency in the data.6 Because these
exceptional cases are not very frequent in the data analyzed below, two
simple expedients were considered. First, the exceptional cases were assumed
to be randomly selected from among those who are chosen by the firm. If
there are n individuals with Y. available, m individuals selected by—9--
the firm but without ratings, and N—n—rn individuals rejected by the firm,
the last term of equation (7) is replaced by
n+m N
£n F(Z.c&)+ £nF(—Zc) in+l in+m+l
Alternatively, we can reinterpret D. to equal 1 whenever a rating is
available, and zero otherwise—a more direct application of the "sample
selection" model. Except as noted, the results in Section III are based
on the first of these strategies.— 10—
II.Data
The data are taken from the personnel files of applicants for super-
visory positions7 at a medium—large (4000 employee) nondurable manufactur-
ing plant. The firm's stated hiring standards were: "inside" applicants
(candidates for promotion) must have a high school degree; "outside" ap-
plicants (new hires) must have a high school degree and previous super-
visory experience, or have a college degree.
The files of 621 males who applied during 1968—70 and 1972—74 are
available. Of these, 422 were either accepted or rejected by the firm
(184 hired, 226 rejected, 12 offered jobs but rejected them). Of the re-
maining 198, 163 withdrew from consideration before a decision could be
made, and no outcome was indicated for 35. Data for the 422 acted—upon
applicants were used in this analysis.
The model described in Section I ignored applicants' reservation
wages and thus is most plausible when the firm is constrained (or chooses)
to pay each successful applicant the same wage. In fact, this was approxi-
mately true for this sample. Starting salary data revealed a clear tendency
for new supervisors to receive the "going" monthly rate at time of hire.
By plotting starting salaries chronologically, a starting rate which changed
about once per year over the period studied could be identified; 78 per cent
of those hired received this starting rate.
The rating used to estimate equation (1) was the individual's latest
rating as a first—line supervisor. Ratings were available for 161 of the
184 hired supervisors. The firm used two different rating forms. Form 1,— 11—
usedprior to 1974, had four ratings (outstanding, average, satisfactory,
below average); Form 2, used since 1974, had five ratings (excels, meets
requirements, above minimum, meets tn.inimuxn, below minimum). To make the
ratings comparable, each was "Z—scored," using a procedure described by
Madoff (1977) and Freeman(1978,p. 135). It was assumed that an under-
lying Continuous performance variable w has a standard—normal distribu-
tion. The frequency distribution of the performance categories for all
ratings was tabulated. From these distributions, the value of the standard—
normal variate at the category boundaries, and the expected value of the
standard—normal variate within each category can be computed.8 For example,
suppose 10 percent of all ratings fall in the lowest category. From a
standard—normal cumulative distribution table, we can infer that the lowest
rating category corresponds to w <—1.28,sincePr(w <—1.28)=.10
The expected value of w within the lowest rating category is
E(wjw <—1.28)=—1.75.If20 percent of ratings fall in the next lowest
category, this category corresponds to —1.28 <w<—.52,since
Pr(w <—.52)=.30,andE(wI—1.28 <w<—.52)=—.86
The information available from the personnel files is summarized in
Table 1. These variables represent most of the factors generally thought
to be important in hiring decisions at this level; in any case, they rep-
resent nearly all of the information that was routinely recorded at this
plant during the hiring process.9
In the estimation of the model, Year of Application is assumed to
influence selection but not performance, while Years in Supervisory Posi-







2. Potential Experience 9.91
(age—schooling—5) (7. 81)
3. Previous Supervisory Experience .453
(1 =yes;0 =no)
4. Inside Applicants .400
(1 =yes;0 =no)
5. Tenure 6.22
(months with firm at time of hiring decision/l2) (5.91)
6. Married
(1 =married,spouse present; 0 =allother) .713
7. Honorable Discharge .379
(1 =honorabledischarge; 0 =allother)
8. In Reserves .076
(1 =inreserves; 0 =allother)
9. Year of Hiring Decision 2.65
(year + month/12 —1970) (1.86)
10. Selected .464
(1 =hiredor offer rejected; 0=rejected)
11.Rating is Form 2 .913
(1=yes;0=no)
12. Years in Supervisory Position 2.95





1. Means and standard deviations on lines 5 and 11—13 are means among inside
applicants and rated workers, respectively.
2. Missing values were coded at sample means for variables 1, 2, and 5, and
included in "no" category for variables 6—8. Number of missing values,
by variable: Schoolirig(5), Potential Experience(16), Tenure(1), Married(ll),
Honorable Discharge and In Reserves (38).— 13—
Theremaining determinants of selection are assumed affect performance,
and vice versa. On a priori grounds, one expects those characteristics
which are preferred in the selection process to have positive effects on
performance. While not strictly necessary for identification, the avail-
ability of some variables not entering both equations should alleviate
reservations about estimating sample selection models in other contexts
(Welch, 1977, p. 455).
The most important aspect of the data, however, is the availability
of data on rejected applicants' Z's. Thus, we have a "censored" sample
rather than the "truncated" samples (Heckman, 1976, p. 476) used in the
employee—performance studies cited in the introduction.— 14—
III.Estimates
Ordinary least squares estimates of the performance equation are
presented in the first coliunn of Table 2. Schooling andPotentialExperi-
ence have positive coefficients, though neither is very large (a year of
schooling corresponding to a .05 standard deviation improvement in the
rating) nor statistically significant. Previous Supervisory Experience
has a negative coefficient with a large standard error. Neither Inside
Applicant nor Tenure is significant, and the estimated advantage of an in-
side applicant with average tenure over an outside applicant
(—.017 + .009*6.22 =.04)is small. Married individuals, those with hon-
orable discharges, and those in the reserves receive lower ratings. Years
in Supervisory Position is strongly and positively related to the perfor-
mance rating.
The results are similar to what one might expect from ordinary least
squares estimates in the face of sample selection: some variables which
might be expected to have positive effects (Schooling, Potential Experience)
have negligible coefficients, while others whose impact on performance might
be doubted are strongly negative (Married, Ronorable Discharge))0 More-
over, the variable which the firm cannot use for selection—Years as a
Supervisor (with this firm)—is positive and statistically significant.
The maimuxn-.1ikeljhood estimates of both selection and performance
equations are also presented in Table 2. The selection equation (right-
most column) is of considerable interest. It indicates that, contrary to
the stated hiring policy, Schooling is only weakly related to the probability— 15—
Table2.
Estimates of Equations (1) and (2)
Performance: Equation (1) Selection: Equation (2)
Variables OLS ML ML
Constant —.871 —1.420 —1.209
(.833) (.926) (.885)
Schooling .043 .050 .045
(.048) (.050) (.054)
Potential Experience .003 .005 .009
(.013) (.014) (.013)
Previous Super. Exper. —.155 —.246 _337*
(.175) (.193) (.164)
Inside Applicant .017 —.037 —.493
(.207) (.205) (.254)
Tenure .009 .025 .147*
(.017) (.020) (.048)
Married —.093 .081 •759*
(.203) (.292) (.174)
Honorable Discharge —.243 —.126 .689*
(.150) (.202) (.159)
In Reserves —.144 .027 .932*
(.219) (.305) (.260)
Yearof Hiring Decision _.161*
(.041)
RatingisForm 2 .315 .197
(.243) (.293)
Yearsin Super.. Position .088* .115*
(.036) (.047)
.100 .101
Standard errors in parentheses beneath coefficients
*= "significant"(t—ratio greater than 1.96)— 16—
ofselection, and Previous Supervisory Experience has a significant nega-
tive effect. Potential Experience has a very small effect, while inside
applicants,11 married workers, and applicants with honorable discharges or
reservist status are preferred. Finally, Year of Decision is significant
and negative, indicating that standardswere rising over time.
A comparison of the maximum—likelihood estimates of the performance
equation (middle column) with the ordinary least squares estimates reveals
predictable changes in the coefficients. The estimated coefficients of
Schooling and Potential Experience change very little, while Previous Super-
visory Experience becomes more negative. The coefficients of the other
variables which were important in selection become more positive (the aver-
age inside applicant's advantage rises from .04 to .12), but while the
changes are fairly sizeable, none of these coefficients becomes "significant".
In general, the standard errors of these coefficients also increase consider-
ably. Years in Supervisory Position remains significantly related to per-
formance.
In addition to the changes in coefficients, the impact of accounting
for selection on the ability to predict performance is of interest. The
presented for the maximum likelihood estimate of the performance equa-
tion uses equation (1') to create a measure analogous to from ordinary
least squares. Using the maximum likelihood estimates of ,, p,and a ,
apredicted value X. + aA was calculated for each rated individual.
The squared correlation of this constructed variable with the actual per-
formance rating was .101, a very small improvement over the ordinary least
squares value.— 17—
Asshown in Section I, the bias in ordinary least squares estimates
(and hence the anticipated changes from maximumlikelihoodestimates) de-
pends on the correlation between the error terms in the selection and per-
formance equations. For the equations in Table 2, the maximum—likelihood
estimate of this correlation was 0.43 (the hypothesis p =0could not be
rejected).
The sensitivity of the results to details of the specification was
examined by several exeriments, two of which are reported in Table 3. Be-
cause the selection equations were virtually unaffected, only the alterna-
tive estimates of the performance equation will be discussed.
The use of the last rating as a measure of performance could be
challenged on the grounds that it obscures the value to the firm of more—
qualified applicants. Those who perform poorly initially might be given
extra attention by their supervisors and eventually perform as well as those
who were better qualified initially. To test this conjecture, the first two
columns of Table 3 report OLS and ML estimates of the performance equation
when the first available rating for each individual is used to measure per-
formance.12 The OLS coefficientsdisplay the same patterns as those in
Table 3, except that Potential Experience has a much larger coefficient
which verges on statistical significance. In general, the ML estimates
differ from their OLS counterparts less than when the last rating was used;
this reflects the weaker correlation between the selection and performance
equations' disturbances here compared with Table 2. (.21 vs. .43). The
effect of years in Supervisory Position with this firm is nearly three times
as large as in Table 2; this suggests that the marginal effect of such ex—— 18—
Table3.
Estimates of Equations (1) and (2)
First Rating Last Rating (half—normal)
PerformanceSelection Performance Selection
Variable OLS OLS ML ML
Constant —.087—.3311.151 .204 —.499 —1.293
(.797) (1.063) (.904) (.500 (.529) (.846)
Schooling —.025—.023 .042 .027 .036 .047
(.049) (.044) (.055) (.029) (.032) (.052)
Potential Experience .024 .025* .007 .003 .005 .009
(.013) (.012) (.013)(.008) (.008) (.013)
PreviousSuper.Exper.—.001—.043_.342* —.064 —.199 —.311
(.173)(.236)(.162)(.105)(.108)(.165)
InsideApplicant .178 .152—.480 .040 .043 —.442
(.210) (.247)(.246) (.125) (.133) (.249)
Tenure —.000 .006 .146* .005 .026* .136*
(.017)(.033)(.048) (.010) (.012) (.046)
Married —.225—.145 .761* —.038 .191 .765*
(.204)(.351)(.176) (.122) (.160) (.174)
Honorable Discharge —.291—.237 .695* —.132 .032 .673*
(.151)(.254)(.160) (.090) (.134) (.157)
In Reserves .030 .110 .958* —.094 .145 .886*
(.220)(.364) (.261) (.132) (.186) (.264)
Yearof Hiring Decision —.168* —.148*
(.041) (.040)
Rating is Form 2 —.263—.307 .194 .011
(.140)(.208) (.146)(.176
Years in Super. Position .237*.249* .050* .089*
(.074) (.071) (.022)(.026)
R2 .168 .171 .087 .082
Standard errors in parentheses beneath coefficients.
*= "significant"(t—ratio greater than 1.96)— 19—
periencedies Out rather quickly. (The mean for this variable at first rating
was 0.96 years compared with 2.95 years at last rating.)
In summarizing the ratings in a single score, the z—scoring procedure
assumed that the underlying continuous performance variable had a normal dis-
tribution. A plausible objection is that, since selection truncates this
distribution, the distribution of observed performance should be asymmetric,
with (muchof)the lower tail removed. To test the sensitivity of the results
to the distribution of performance among those rated assumed in z—scoring,
an extreme alternative was considered. Since roughly half of the applicants
were hired, it was assumed that performance followed the upper half of a normal
distribution, i.e., f(y) =(2/71)½exp(—y2/2) 0 < y < + ,andtherating
categories were z—scored on thisbasis.As the last two columns of Table 3
demonstrate,the most important effect of this respecification is the improve— -
mentin the coefficients of marital and military status variables. None, how-
ever, is statistically significant. The improvement is due to the increased
estimated correlation between selection and performancedisturbances,which
now reaches .83.
Two further experiments were considered. First, a dummy variable for
those hired at premium pay was added to the performanceequationusingthe
Table2 specifications. This variable was statistically insignificant, and
the other coefficients were not appreciably affected. Second, the variable
in equation (3) was redefined as "rated't rather than "selected", as dis—
cussed in Section I. Onceagain,this modification had no appreciable affect
on the performance equation.— 20—
IVConclusions
Ordinary least squares estimates of the determinants of employee per—
fortnance are likely to give biased estimates of the importance of the various
factors which firms use in hiring. The magnitude of this bias, however, de-
pends on the selection process of the firm, being most important when the
firm accurately judges unrecorded attributes of applicants which are in fact
importantdeterminants of later performance. Consequently, the magnitude of
such biases will vary from one context to another—as will the determinants
of performance themselves.
For the firmstudiedhere mad.mum likelihood estimates of the deter-
minants of employee performance differed appreciably from ordinary least
squaresestimates in some cases, suggesting that selection bias of some im-
portance. However, none of the applicant characteristics available at time
of hiring were significantly related to later performance. In some cases
(Schooling, Potential Experience) these variables appear to have had little
impact on the hiring decision, so that their lack of impact on performance is
unremarkable. The remaining variables were, however, important in the decision
procedure.
Years in Supervisory Position was strongly related to performance.
Whilethisappears to contradict the findings of Medoff (1977) and Medoff and
Abraham(1978), such a conclusion would, be unwarranted. In each of the samples
they studied, the average level of company experience (presumably, mostly super-
visory) was 12 years or more, compared with three years of supervisory ex-
perience with the firm in the sample studied here. Moreover, the coefficient
was much smaller for last rating than first rating, suggesting that the mar-
ginal effect of such experience after a year or two could be very small.— 21—
Theapparent lack of relationship between the characteristics preferred
by the firm and subsequent performance is subject to two qualifications.
First, characteristics such as being married may be used by the firm to select
those who will stay with the firm (minimizing future hiring and training costs)
even if they perform no better on the job. Second, the
parameters of the performance equation are not estimated with great precision,
due in part to smaller sample size than previous applications of the sample
selection model. If this finding is supported by later research, it would mean
that the model could be used successfully only for larger firms or less elite
jobs than studied here. However, the difference in estimated coefficients
due to correcting for selection bias reported above suggests that this problem
may be of considerable practical importance in some contexts.— 22—
Footnotes
1. Cost—minimizing behavior is a major point of agreement for "human—
capital't (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1974) and "screening" (Arrow, 1973;
Spence, 1973) models of schooling.
2. Campbell etal. (1969, p. 39) state that all of the sample of large
firms they studied selected managers in this way.
3. The sample—selection problem. is treated as a "restriction in range" in
this literature, which emphasizes correlations rather than regression
coefficients. More recent studies give no indication that the "insuper-
able barrier" has been overcome; e.g., Whitla (1968, p. 470) who reports
that the restrictiw models "seem to have fallen into general disfavor"
because their assumptions "are often hard to meet", Schmidt etal. (1976)
who discuss the importance of selection in small—sample studies, and
Maxwell (1974, p. 59) who presents a restriction in range correction
for regression coefficients.
4. This implies that we "give credit" to X for any performance determinant
which is correlated with X .Thisis appropriate when the firm's goal
is to predict performance, rather than to determine its "causes."
5. Presumably, elements of Z are also elements of X .However,X may
include variables not available at time of hiring, but subsequently
available for those who are hired (e.g., time between selection and
measurement of performance).
6. The relative frequency affects the ability of the data to "support" a
more complicated analysis as well as the likely practical value of
undertaking it.— 23—
7.Twenty—one "supervisory" applicants were hired into nonsupervisory
(generally technical) positions andweredeleted from the analysis.
8. Guilford (1954, pp. 181—2) discusses a similar procedure, except that
the conditional median is used instead of the conditional mean.
9. Three available variables were excluded to limit the number of
parameters to be estimated; they were nearly uncorrelated with
othervariables among applicants (dummy variables for health problems,
G.E.D. high school degree, and race).
10. If the firm prefers, say, marriedapplicants, one would anticipate
that the estimated coefficient of Married would be negatively biased.
If the true coefficient were zero, the estimated coefficient should
be negative.
11. The advantage of the average inside applicant is —.493 + .147 *6.22=.42.
12. Using the average rating produced results quite similar to those for
first rating, presented below.— 24—
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